

## INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

August 3, 2020  
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**TO:** The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

**FROM:** Chief of Police

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AUG 14 2020 ✓  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

**SUBJECT:** K-9 CONTACT REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION, FID NO. 047-19

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis and findings for K-9 Contact Requiring Hospitalization, Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 047-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on July 6, 2020. I have adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

### SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

On Sunday, October 6, 2019, at 2236:40 hours, an unknown female telephoned Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Communications Division (CD). She reported that a white truck had been parked in front of 230 Bernard Avenue over the weekend and was occupied by a male Hispanic. She went on to describe the individual as being approximately 45 years old and possibly under the influence of narcotics.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 2241 hours, CD generated a non-priority prowler/vehicle at a dwelling radio call: "Subj veh wht Ford pickup truck 91121J1 parked at loc since 10/5 at 0830, Subj M/H 45 yrs NFD, poss living in veh," at 230 Bernard Avenue, RD 1414, Incident 191006005623.

According to the FID investigation, Officers R. Castillo, Serial No. 41733, and J. Suchecki, Serial No. 42450, Pacific Patrol Division, were assigned the radio call and they proceeded to 230 Bernard Avenue. At 2244:20 hours, CD broadcast, "14A13, 14A13, your prowler complaint is now a GTA (Grand Theft Auto) suspect there now, suspect vehicle license 91121J1 returns 2011, Ford F15, correction F150 pickup, white, Code-37, is now Code-Two, incident 5623, RD 1414."

According to the FID investigation, at 2245:20 hours, Officer Castillo broadcast that they were Code-Six. Officer Suchecki stopped their marked black and white police vehicle south of the possible stolen vehicle, which was parked along the east curb of Bernard Avenue. Officer Castillo confirmed the Ford F150 truck was stolen via their Mobile Data Computer (MDC).

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<sup>1</sup> The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Officers Castillo and Suchecki exited their police vehicle and illuminated the stolen vehicle with the spotlight on their police vehicle. Both officers observed the suspect, later identified as Garrett Coressel, seated in the driver's seat of the truck.

According to the FID investigation, at 2245:40 hours, Officer Castillo broadcast a request for a back-up, supervisor, and an air unit. Sergeant D. Jacobs, Serial No. 37696, Pacific Patrol Division, broadcast he was responding to the back-up request.

According to the FID investigation, Officers Castillo and Suchecki gave verbal commands to Coressel instructing him to put his hands outside of his truck's window. Coressel opened his front driver's side door, partially stepped out of the stolen vehicle, and faced toward the officers. Coressel was wearing a gray t-shirt and tan pants. Approximately seven seconds later, Coressel turned away from the officers and fled on foot, northbound on Bernard Avenue. Officers Castillo and Suchecki re-entered their police vehicle and followed Coressel (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Passing Unsearched Vehicles**).

According to the FID investigation, at 2246:30 hours, Officer Castillo broadcast that Coressel was fleeing north on Bernard Avenue. Coressel ran north past Dewey Street, continued through Ozone Park and onto Ozone Street. Officers Castillo and Suchecki drove north on Bernard Avenue to east on Ozone Street. As Coressel ran west on the north sidewalk of Ozone Street, Officers Castillo and Suchecki exited their police vehicle and followed Coressel on foot. Coressel ran onto the property at 721 Ozone Street and continued north along the east side yard of the property (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Basic Firearm Safety Rules**).

According to the FID investigation, at 2247:22 hours, Officer Castillo broadcast he and Officer Suchecki were in foot pursuit northbound from Ozone Street. Officers Castillo and Suchecki lost sight of Coressel as he climbed over a rear fence (north side) of 721 Ozone Street, onto the east/west alley located between Ozone Street and Navy Street. Due to the rear fence acting as a barrier, Officers Castillo and Suchecki discontinued their foot pursuit of Coressel. They returned to their police vehicle and proceeded to establish a perimeter for containment of Coressel.

According to the FID investigation, at 2247:50 hours, Officers L. Rosas, Serial No. 42085, and C. Perez, Serial No. 43724, Pacific Patrol Division, arrived at 721 Ozone Street and assisted in establishing the perimeter. At 2248:20 hours, Officer E Hewitt, Pilot, Serial No. 39644, and Officer J. Stevenson, Tactical Flight Officer (TFO), Serial No. 38712, Air Support Division (ASD), assigned Air 18, responded over the scene and assisted in establishing a perimeter. Officer Stevenson assisted in establishing a perimeter from Marine Street to the north, Longfellow Street to the east, Ozone Street to the south, and 7th Street to the west.<sup>2</sup> Officer Stevenson broadcast a request for the incident to switch to a tactical frequency and advised he would contact the Metropolitan Division, K-9 Unit.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The perimeter was within the City of Santa Monica and approximately three blocks in size.

<sup>3</sup> Once the perimeter was established, communications for the incident were transferred to West Bureau Tactical 1, Channel 39 (TAC 1, Channel 39).

According to the FID investigation, at 2254:30 hours, Sergeant Jacobs arrived at scene, identified himself as the Incident Commander (IC), and established a Command Post (CP) at Machado Drive and Lincoln Boulevard. Sergeant Jacobs was contacted by Sergeant H. Miller, Serial No. 26238, Metropolitan Division, K-9 Unit, and briefed him on the incident. Sergeant Miller advised K-9 units were currently on a search in North Hollywood Division, but would respond once that search was complete.

According to the FID investigation, at 2315:36 hours, Officer Stevenson broadcast that Metropolitan Division, K-9 units were enroute from North Hollywood Division to their perimeter in Pacific Division. At 2329:20 hours, Sergeant J. Kim (Pilot), Serial No. 34555, and Officer R. Golden (TFO), Serial No. 31566, ASD, assigned Air 3, arrived over the perimeter and relieved Air 18.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 2320 hours, the following Metropolitan Division K-9 personnel responded to the CP: Sergeant H. Miller, along with Officers S. Jenkins, Serial No. 26806, N. Huynh, Serial No. 31499, A. Ramirez, Serial No. 33872, A. Governale, Serial No. 40360, and M. Peters, Serial No. 30256, Metropolitan Division, K-9 Unit **(Additional/Equipment – Police Attire and TASER Positioning)**.

According to Sergeant Miller, he confirmed with Sergeant Jacobs that Coressel was *wanted for GTA* (Grand Theft Auto) and that Coressel *would be arrested* for that crime. Additionally, Sergeant Miller verified that Officers Castillo and Suchecki would be able to either *eliminate or identify* Coressel as the suspect. Based on the information he received, Sergeant Miller confirmed that the criteria for a K-9 deployment for a search was met and he authorized K-9 officers to conduct a search for the GTA suspect **(Deployment of K-9)**.

According to Officer Jenkins, he was informed by Sergeant Jacobs, Officers Castillo and Suchecki that *they had a stolen vehicle and that it appeared that the suspect* (Coressel) *was potentially living in the vehicle*. Upon contact with Coressel he initially appeared to be complying with commands, however, Coressel *took off running*. Officers *lost sight of him as he jumped a rear fence* at 721 Ozone Street. Officer Jenkins was also provided with a detailed description of Coressel and was advised *that there was no evidence that Coressel was armed*. Officer Jenkins verified with Sergeant Jacobs that Coressel would be arrested *for a stolen vehicle offense*.

According to Officer Jenkins, he formulated a tactical search plan that consisted of two K-9 search teams working in coordination with each other. Officer Jenkins was designated to lead the first K-9 search team with K-9 Dutch, Serial No. K9-328, along with Officers Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> K-9 Dutch, Breed: Belgian Malinois, four years old. Appointed to the Department on January 24, 2019 and received Field Certification on June 28, 2019. Prior to this incident, K-9 Dutch had 15 deployments, 13 finds and four contacts. This incident is the first CUOF for K-9 Dutch, as his prior four contacts did not reach the level of a CUOF incident.



Officer Peters was designated to lead the second search team with K-9 Storm, Serial No. K9-324, along with Officers Castillo and Suchecki. The search plan involved Officer Jenkins' team responding and searching the location where Coressel jumped over the fence, 721 Ozone Street, then holding at that position. Officer Peters' team would search *the alley north of Ozone Street, south of Navy Street*. If Coressel was not located, Officer Jenkins intended for both K-9 teams to move north to Navy Street where they would start *mid-block* and search the south side of Navy Street.<sup>5</sup>

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant Miller concurred with the search plan. Sergeant Jacobs approved the search plan, as well as the deployment of K-9 for a search **(Additional/Equipment – Ballistic Helmets)**.

According to the FID investigation, prior to the K-9 search, Officer Jenkins briefed and designated assignments to his team, who were all Metropolitan Division K-9 handlers. The officers would work in a diamond formation, with Officer Huynh assigned as the point cover officer, Officer Jenkins would handle K-9 Dutch, and Officers Ramirez and Governale would cover the team's rear and flanks. All the officers on Jenkins' search team were armed with their service pistols and equipped with their TASERs.<sup>6</sup>

According to the FID investigation, between 0009 and 0021 hours, multiple K-9 search announcements were made in English and Spanish over the Public Address (PA) systems from police vehicles positioned around the perimeter. Additionally, Air 3 broadcast K-9 search announcements in English and Spanish from the air unit's PA system. The officers making the announcements utilized a pre-recorded message from the MDC in their respective police vehicles. Their positions on the perimeter and the shop numbers of the police vehicles were documented by Sergeant Miller. Officers on the perimeter advised the CP they heard the K-9 search announcements. Coressel failed to respond to the K-9 search announcements and remained hidden in an attempt to evade apprehension.

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, FID detectives located and interviewed a total of eight civilian witnesses that were within the perimeter. All of them stated they heard the K-9 search announcements. After he was detained, Coressel refused to answer questions or otherwise make any statements to investigators regarding the K-9 search announcements.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Jenkins' team cleared the property at 721 Ozone Street and Officer Peters' team cleared the east/west alley north of Ozone Street, without locating Coressel. Officers Suchecki and Castillo met with Officer Jenkins' search team to the rear of 721 Ozone Street and confirmed the area where Coressel had jumped over the fence into the alley. After receiving information regarding a possible prowler radio call at 724 Navy Street, Officer Jenkins directed both search teams to move north to the south side of Navy Street. Officer Jenkins' team searched the property at 724 Navy Street while enroute to Navy Street.

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<sup>5</sup> The K-9 search teams received additional information of a prowler call at 724 Navy Street which led Officer Jenkins to adjust his search to begin at that location first.

<sup>6</sup> The officers on the search teams drew their service pistols during the search due to Coressel being an outstanding felony GTA suspect.

Officer Jenkins' search team began searching east from 724 Navy Street, while Officer Peters' search team searched west from 724 Navy Street.

According to Officer Jenkins, K-9 Dutch continually worked *along the front of some residences* along the south side of Navy Street, until K-9 Dutch made a right turn into a narrow walkway between the residences of 738 and 740 Navy Street. After momentarily losing sight of K-9 Dutch, Officer Jenkins and his team moved into a position to where they could better see down the side of the residences and keep a visual of K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins observed K-9 Dutch had moved south to the end of the walkway and was returning when *he kind of starts to sniff some plants*. Officer Jenkins' line of sight was partially *obscured* by the *bushes and tree line* along the east side of the walkway partially, which blocked his view of the top portion of K-9 Dutch's body. As K-9 Dutch was searching *back there that's when* Officer Jenkins heard *someone yell*. Based on Officer Jenkins hearing the yell and observing the action *from K-9 Dutch's hind quarter area*, it appeared to Officer Jenkins *that a K-9 contact* had occurred. Officer Jenkins did not actually see the *contact occurring* until Coressel came *out into the middle of the walkway between the two residences (K-9 Contact)*.

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0057:42 hours, Coressel can be heard yelling on Officer Jenkins' Body Worn Video (BWV).

According to Officer Jenkins, he was not able to *see what initiated the contact* but believed that *based on his experience and K-9 Dutch's training, if someone yells and moves to make that yelling sound*, it is something that could have been interpreted by K-9 Dutch as a *violent threat*. Officer Jenkins opined yelling is an action that is typically accompanied by *movement*. Officer Jenkins believed that Coressel's *actions of yelling and movement* could have prompted K-9 Dutch to respond with a bite.

**Note:** According to Officer Jenkins, K-9 Dutch was trained to *find and bark*. However, if the *suspect moves, becomes aggressive, or tries to flee*, police service dogs are *allowed to bite the suspect*. If the police service dogs are attacked, they *are allowed to defend themselves*.<sup>7</sup>

According to Officer Jenkins, Coressel became *very aggressive with K-9 Dutch* as he placed K-9 Dutch in a *carotid choke hold* and *rolled his body over onto K-9 Dutch's neck, pinning K-9 Dutch to the ground*. Officer Jenkins immediately yelled for Coressel *to stop moving* and to let go of K-9 Dutch. Coressel *failed to comply* to his repeated commands to stop moving. Coressel continued his *aggressive attack on K-9 Dutch* and appeared that he *was trying to physically harm K-9 Dutch*.

According to Officer Jenkins, he directed his team to move up to a closer position to better assess the tactical situation. Based on Coressel's *aggressive behavior* toward K-9 Dutch, Officer Jenkins *formed the opinion* that Coressel would *fight* with officers if they attempted to physically

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<sup>7</sup> An LAPD police service dog is trained to react by biting the suspect in response to an aggressive, threatening or evasive action directed at the police service dog, K-9 Handler or others (Los Angeles Police Department, TacOps Newsletter, Use of Force Review Division, Volume 10, No. 2, May 2015).



contact and take Coressel into custody. Officer Jenkins assessed that he needed to get K-9 Dutch away from Coressel's hold to be able to recall him. As K-9 Dutch was *still biting* Coressel and the only way to *minimize and prevent additional injury* to Coressel would be to *stop his aggressive violent behavior* toward K-9 Dutch. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, recall K-9 Dutch, and safely take Coressel into custody, Officer Jenkins requested a TASER to be deployed.

According to the FID investigation, as Officer Jenkins requested a TASER be deployed, Officer Huynh moved south past Officer Governale and into the narrow walkway with Officers Governale and Jenkins following behind him. Officers Jenkins and Huynh continuously gave Coressel verbal commands to let go of K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh approached to within ten feet of Coressel's location, holstered his service pistol, and drew his TASER in a two-handed grip (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands**).<sup>8</sup>

According to Officer Huynh, as he approached Coressel and K-9 Dutch, he observed that there was *nothing immediate* in Coressel's hands. Coressel was *choking* and *actively fighting* K-9 Dutch, while K-9 Dutch had a *bite hold* on Coressel's right lower leg area. As Officer Huynh approached to a distance of approximately eight to ten feet, he determined that transitioning to a less-lethal tool was the optimal option based on Coressel's *violent behavior with* K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh opined that if officers had attempted to physically take Coressel into custody, Coressel's *violent behavior* toward K-9 Dutch would *translate* toward the officers. There would also be a high potential an officer could be bitten if they approached K-9 Dutch, while engaged in a struggle with Coressel. Officer Huynh observed Coressel was in a *curled-up position with a choke hold* on K-9 Dutch, while at the same time *putting his body weight on top of* K-9 Dutch. Based on the positioning of Coressel and K-9 Dutch, Officer Huynh was sure K-9 Dutch *couldn't get out of* Coressel's hold, which would lead K-9 Dutch to continue to defend himself against Coressel. Officer Huynh stated he *was concerned* for Coressel's *welfare because the longer* Coressel *held onto* K-9 Dutch, *the greater potential for* Coressel to be *injured even further*. Officer Huynh deployed his TASER in order to de-escalate Coressel's *aggressive actions and incapacitate* Coressel *long enough* so that Coressel would release his choke hold of K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh aimed his TASER at Coressel's back area and activated in probe mode. Officer Huynh stated there was no time to feasibly issue a Use of Force Warning because Coressel was already choking and holding down K-9 Dutch (**Less-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Use of Force Warning**).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> According to the FID investigation, Officer Jenkins initially unholstered his TASER, however he observed that Officer Huynh had already drawn his TASER. Officer Jenkins immediately holstered his TASER and drew his service pistol.

<sup>9</sup> According to the FID investigation, the TASER log of Officer Huynh TASER documented his initial TASER activation lasting six seconds, when the standard TASER cycle is five seconds. The second and third activations lasted for five seconds. Further investigation determined that Officer Huynh's TASER was equipped with an outdated battery, which could have accounted for the six second TASER cycle. Metropolitan Division has conducted an audit to ensure all Divisional TASERs are equipped with updated batteries. Additionally, the Department sent out notifications to all personnel to have their TASERs inspected to ensure they are equipped with updated batteries.

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0057:59 hours, Officer Huynh activated his first TASER from an approximate distance of ten feet.

According to the FID investigation, after the first TASER activation, Coressel released K-9 Dutch and Coressel rolled left onto his back, facing toward Officer Huynh. K-9 Dutch then obtained a bite hold of Coressel's right calf area. Officer Huynh observed Coressel continued moving and to prevent Coressel from reengaging with K-9 Dutch, Officer Huynh activated his TASER for a second cycle.

According to Officer Huynh, he observed that the first TASER activation *didn't have the immediate effect* of neuromuscular incapacitation that a TASER commonly generates. Officer Huynh observed Coressel continue to have *mobility* in his arms and was *still thrashing around*. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a second time in order to prevent Coressel from re-engaging K-9 Dutch and *going back* to his *violent behavior (Less-Lethal Use of Force)*.

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0058:06 hours, Officer Huynh activated his TASER for the second time.<sup>10</sup>

According to Officer Jenkins, he observed that Officer Huynh's first TASER activation did not fully stop Coressel's actions as Coressel *continued to fight with K-9 Dutch*. Officer Jenkins heard a second TASER activation and observed a *moment maybe about a second, second and a half where it seemed like Coressel let go of K-9 Dutch*. Officer Jenkins immediately recalled K-9 Dutch by issuing the first *Platz* command, which is a *heel command*.<sup>11</sup> Officer Jenkins also *utilized* his E-Collar in conjunction with his first *three Platz* commands.<sup>12</sup>

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0058:12 hours, Officer Jenkins issued his first of nine "Platz" commands.

According to Officer Jenkins, he believed K-9 Dutch released his bite hold after his first "Platz" command. Officer Jenkins then observed Coressel reach out and grab K-9 Dutch, which caused K-9 Dutch to re-engage with Coressel.

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0058:14 hours, Officer Jenkins issued his second "Platz" command. The FID investigation determined K-9 Dutch released his bite hold of Coressel during Officer Jenkin's second "Platz" command.

According to Officer Huynh, *after the second TASER activation ended there was a brief moment where Coressel was able to sit himself back up and then grab K-9 Dutch again*. Officer Huynh

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<sup>10</sup> According to the FID investigation, Officer Huynh's second TASER activation occurred seven seconds after his initial TASER activation.

<sup>11</sup> The command "Platz" is a German word for "down," and is the commonly used verbal command for a K-9 to heel and/or return to its handler.

<sup>12</sup> E-Collar is an electronic collar utilized by K-9 handlers to help the handler give correction to the police service dog. The E-Collar is used in conjunction with verbal commands. The collar is used via a remote-control device that the handler activates.



observed that Coressel *was able to get full mobility again* and Coressel's arm was *wrapped around* K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh believed that allowing Coressel to re-engage and continue to fight with K-9 Dutch would only increase the potential *for injury* to Coressel. Officer Huynh believed he needed to *give* Officer Jenkins *the opportunity to call* K-9 Dutch *back*, so no further injury would be sustained by Coressel. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a third time in order to limit Coressel's aggressive behavior (**Less-Lethal Use of Force**).

**Note:** According to the FID investigation, at approximately 0058:14 hours, Officer Huynh activated his TASER for the third time.<sup>13</sup>

According to the FID investigation, after the third TASER activation, Coressel released K-9 Dutch and laid on his back. Officer Jenkins issued additional "Platz" commands to help navigate K-9 Dutch back to Officer Jenkins' position, where he placed K-9 Dutch on a leash. Officer Huynh ordered Coressel into a high-risk prone position by having him lay face down with his hands out to his side. As Officers Huynh and Governale provided cover, Officer Ramirez approached Coressel and handcuffed him without further incident. Coressel was then walked to the front of 738 Navy Street, where he was sat down on the south curb.

According to the FID investigation, at 0059 hours, Officer Jenkins contacted the CP to request a Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Coressel at 738 Navy Street. Officers Castillo and Suchecki responded to Coressel's location and positively identified Coressel as the GTA suspect that had fled from the stolen truck (**Post K-9 Contact Procedures**).

According to the FID investigation, at 0116 hours, Santa Monica Fire Department (SMFD) personnel responded to the scene. They transported Coressel to University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), Santa Monica Hospital for a dog bite injury to his right lower leg and TASER puncture wounds to his back. Officers O. Baeza, Serial No. 36110, and A. Jalomo, Serial No. 43803, Pacific Patrol Division, were tasked with accompanying Coressel to the hospital (**Post K-9 Contact Procedures**).

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant Miller determined Coressel's leg injury caused by the K-9 contact appeared severe enough to possibly require hospitalization. Sergeant Miller, believing the incident could result into a Categorical Use of Force (CUOF), admonished Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale not to speak about the incident, and had them separated and monitored at Pacific Station. Sergeant Miller advised Sergeant Jacobs that the incident may potentially become a CUOF. Sergeant Jacobs later notified FID of the potential for the incident to be investigated as a CUOF and had Officers Castillo and Suchecki separated and monitored at Pacific Station.

According to the FID investigation, at 0416 hours, Detective T. Grabe, Serial No. 32649, FID, received telephonic notification to respond to Pacific Division Community Police Station to conduct a CUOF Assessment of the K-9 contact incident.

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<sup>13</sup> According to the FID investigation, Officer Huynh's third TASER activation occurred eight seconds after his second TASER activation.



According to the FID investigation, Coressel received medical treatment at UCLA Santa Monica Hospital. Medical records noted Coressel refused to communicate. After discussion with plastic surgeon, Coressel was recommended to be discharged with wound care instructions. At 0438 hours, Coressel was released and cleared to be booked to a detention center that could provide Coressel's wound care instruction. Officers Baeza and Jalomo transported Coressel to Pacific Division Community Police Station for booking.

While waiting to be booked, Coressel's leg bandage came off, requiring the response of the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD). At 0702 hours, Coressel was subsequently transported to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center by LAFD RA No. 867. The medical staff noted that Coressel was non-responsive to their medical questions, including Coressel not providing his name. Ultimately, Doctor S. Kim advised that Coressel's bite wound could not be closed for 24 hours and that Coressel would need to be admitted to the hospital for observation and a surgical consultation.<sup>14</sup>

According to the FID investigation, at 1050 hours, after learning that Coressel would be admitted to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center, Detective A. Rheault, Serial No. 33961, FID, notified the Department Operations Center (DOC) of Coressel's hospitalization and that FID would be handling the administrative investigation related to the K-9 contact.

## **FINDINGS**

**Tactics** – Tactical Debrief, Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale.

**Less-Lethal Use of Force** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Huynh.

**Deployment of K-9** – Consistent with established criteria.

**Contact of K-9** – Consistent with established criteria.

**Post K-9 Contact Procedures** – Consistent with established criteria.

## **ANALYSIS**<sup>15</sup>

### **Detention**

Officers from Pacific Division responded to a radio call of a male using a parked vehicle as a dwelling. The patrol officers were additionally advised by CD that the vehicle described in their

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<sup>14</sup> According to FID investigation, a review of Coressel's UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center medical records indicated that Coressel was seen by Doctor F. Day on October 7, 2019. Doctor Day noted that Coressel suffered from two puncture wounds on his back attributed to the use of a TASER and skin loss and a large laceration on his right lower leg attributed to a police dog bite.

<sup>15</sup> The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the FID investigation.

radio call was a stolen vehicle. Officers observed the vehicle at the radio call location and verified the vehicle was stolen via their MDC. Officers observed a lone male suspect in the driver's seat of the stolen vehicle and began giving him commands to exit the stolen vehicle. The suspect exited the vehicle and fled on foot from the location. Officers followed after the suspect in their police vehicle then engaged in a brief foot pursuit of him. Officers lost sight of the suspect after he jumped over a fence. Officers established containment of the area and Metropolitan Division, K-9 officers were contacted to respond for a search. A K-9 search located the suspect at which time a K-9 contact occurred. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

## **Tactics**

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

### Tactical De-Escalation

*Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.*

#### Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, October 2016).*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

**Planning** – Officer Jenkins and Sergeant Miller responded to the CP and were briefed by the Sergeant Jacobs and Officers Castillo and Suchecki. Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins were informed of the circumstances leading up to the response of Metropolitan Division K-9 units,



including that Coressel was a felony GTA suspect who had fled from officers and was believed to be contained within the established perimeter. They confirmed that if Coressel were located and identified, he would be arrested for the felony GTA offense. Officer Jenkins was provided with a detailed description of Coressel and was advised that there was no evidence that Coressel was armed. Officer Jenkins formulated a tactical search plan that consisted of two K-9 search teams working in coordination with each other. Officer Jenkins was designated to lead the first K-9 search team with K-9 Dutch and Officer Peters was designated to lead the second search team with K-9 Storm. The search plan involved Officer Jenkins' team responding and searching the location where Coressel jumped over the fence, 721 Ozone Street, then holding at that position. Officer Peters' team would search the alley north of Ozone Street, south of Navy Street. If Coressel was not located, Officer Jenkins' intended for both K-9 teams to move north to Navy Street and starting from mid-block, to search the south side of Navy Street. The search plan was approved by Sergeants Miller and Jacobs. Officer Jenkins briefed his search team of their assignments and the search plan.

Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins assured pre-recorded K-9 search announcements were broadcast in English and Spanish over the PA systems from police vehicles positioned around the perimeter and from the air unit above the perimeter. Sergeant Miller documented the results of the K-9 search announcements.

**Assessment** – Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins assessed Coressel was an outstanding felony GTA suspect and determined the criteria for a K-9 search was met. Officer Jenkins assessed Coressel was as an unarmed suspect, allowing K-9 Dutch, a limited search certified police service dog, to conduct the K-9 search.<sup>16</sup>

Officer Jenkins heard Coressel yell out and observed Coressel holding K-9 Dutch around the neck area and believed K-9 Dutch had obtained a bite hold of Coressel. Officer Jenkins immediately assessed the tactical situation and verbally communicated to his team to move closer. Officer Jenkins stated Coressel placed K-9 Dutch in a carotid choke hold and rolled his body over onto K-9 Dutch's neck, pinning him to the ground. Officer Jenkins believed Coressel was trying to physically harm K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins immediately yelled for Coressel to stop moving and to let go of K-9 Dutch. Coressel failed to comply to Officer Jenkins' repeated commands to stop moving. Based on Coressel's aggressive behavior toward K-9 Dutch, Officer Jenkins opined that Coressel would additionally fight with officers if they attempted to take Coressel into custody. Officer Jenkins assessed he needed to get K-9 Dutch away from Coressel's hold so that he could recall K-9 Dutch and at the same time prevent additional injury to Coressel. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, Officer Jenkins requested a TASER to be deployed.

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<sup>16</sup> As of the date of the incident, K-9 Dutch was a Limited Certified Police Service Dog who had completed his basic training but has not proven themselves in the field. As such, a Limited Certified Police Service Dog is only deployed on searches when the outstanding suspect is reasonably believed to be unarmed and the search team is comprised of all K-9 handlers and a trainer (Officer Jenkins is a K-9 handler and trainer). Once the police service dog has consistently and successfully made quality finds, then that service dog will be given a Full Certified status and can be used to search for armed suspects as well.



Officer Huynh observed Coressel choking and actively fighting K-9 Dutch, while K-9 Dutch had a bite hold on Coressel's right lower leg area. Officer Huynh assessed the situation and determined that transitioning to a less-lethal tool was the optimal option based on Coressel's violent behavior with K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh opined that if officers attempted to physically take Coressel into custody, Coressel's violent behavior toward K-9 Dutch would translate toward the officers. There would also be a high potential an officer could be bitten if they approached K-9 Dutch, while he was engaged in a struggle with Coressel. Officer Huynh observed Coressel was in a curled-up position with a choke hold on K-9 Dutch, while at the same time putting his body weight on top of K-9 Dutch. Based on the positioning of Coressel and K-9 Dutch, Officer Huynh assessed K-9 Dutch couldn't get out of Coressel's hold, leading K-9 Dutch to continue to defend himself against Coressel. Officer Huynh stated he was concerned for Coressel's welfare because the longer Coressel held onto K-9 Dutch, the greater potential for Coressel to be injured even further. Officer Huynh deployed his TASER in order to de-escalate Coressel's aggressive behavior and incapacitate Coressel long enough so that Coressel would release his choke hold of K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh aimed his TASER at Coressel's back area and activated the TASER in probe mode. Officer Huynh assessed prior to each of his three TASER activations.

**Time** – Upon the arrival of Metropolitan Division K-9 officers to the CP, they utilized the time they had to assess the information provided by Sergeant Jacobs, Officers Castillo and Suchecki. Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins determined the situation met the criteria for a K-9 search. Officer Jenkins took the necessary time to formulate a tactical plan which utilized the officers they had at scene as well as the K-9s that were available. Officer Jenkins took the time to inform his team members of their roles and the search plan. Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins did not start the K-9 search until the K-9 announcements were properly conducted.

Officers Jenkin and Peter's teams conducted a thorough and methodical search, taking the time to make contact with various citizens inside the search area and taking into account all pertinent information that was provided. Once Officer Jenkins heard Coressel yell out and observed he was physically attempting to harm K-9 Dutch. He immediately ordered Coressel to stop moving and to let go of K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins communicated to his team his observations and rapidly closed the distance to Coressel and K-9 Dutch with his team. Officers Jenkins and Huynh observed Coressel's aggressive actions in his attempt to choke K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh deployed his TASER in an effort to prevent Coressel's continued aggressive and combative actions towards K-9 Dutch, which could lead to further injury to Coressel. Officer Jenkins recalled K-9 Dutch as soon as Officer Jenkins observed Coressel release K-9 Dutch. Due to Coressel's violent actions and the dynamic nature of the physical confrontation between Coressel and K-9 Dutch, Officers Jenkins and Huynh were afforded only minimal time to react to the tactical situation.

**Redeployment and/or Containment** – Prior to the arrival of Metropolitan Division K-9 officers to the CP, a perimeter had been established and containment of the area had been coordinated by the responding officers and the air unit. Throughout the K-9 search, the perimeter positions, established by patrol and Metropolitan Division officers, were maintained in order to keep proper containment of the search area.



Once K-9 Dutch made contact with Coressel, Officer Jenkins and his team closed distance in an attempt to assess the tactical situation. Due to the confined space of the narrow walkway, Officer Jenkins and his team observed that Coressel was contained, however; K-9 Dutch could not be recalled or redeployed due to Coressel utilizing his bodyweight to hold K-9 Dutch down. Additionally, Officer Jenkins and his team were unable to redeploy due to the confined area they were in and the essential nature of maintaining clear visual contact with Coressel and K-9 Dutch, in order to determine the best tactical option to prevent further injury to Coressel and take him into custody without further incident.

**Other Resources** – After Officers Castillo and Suchecki lost visual contact with Coressel, they established a perimeter to contain the area with the assistance of responding officers and the air unit. Sergeant Jacobs, the IC, after receiving pertinent information regarding the incident, notified Metropolitan Division of the situation, and requested Metropolitan Division K-9 officers to respond and assist with a search.

Metropolitan Division K-9 officers responded to the CP and utilized resources at scene, including patrol and Metropolitan Division police vehicle PA systems as well as pre-recorded K-9 announcements on the MDC of those vehicles. Additionally, Officer Jenkins utilized the air unit to broadcast a K-9 announcement in order to confirm they covered the entire area within the established perimeter. Metropolitan Division K-9 officers utilized two of the four police service dogs they had at their disposal and determined the use of the remaining two K-9s would not be appropriate based on the number of officers that were required to maintain the perimeter in a condensed residential area.

**Lines of Communication** – Sergeant Jacobs, established lines of communication with the officers at scene as well as Metropolitan Division K-9 officers when he informed them of the incident and requested Metropolitan Division K-9 officers respond to assist with a search.

Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins opened lines of communication with Sergeant Jacobs and Officers Castillo and Suchecki upon their arrival to the CP and received information regarding the incident and Coressel's description. Officer Jenkins established lines of communication with his team members when he assigned their roles and advised them of the search plan. Officer Jenkins maintained lines of communication with the CP and perimeter units as he updated the progress of the search periodically. Additionally, Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins attempted to open lines of communication with Coressel by having multiple K-9 announcements made throughout the perimeter in an attempt to notify Coressel of the impending K-9 search and have him surrender peacefully.

Upon K-9 Dutch's contact with Coressel, Officer Jenkins immediately attempted to open lines of communication with him by ordering Coressel to stop moving and let go of K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins maintained his lines of communication with his team by advising them of his observations and directing them to move up in order to better assess the best tactical option to deploy. Officer Huynh directed Coressel to let go of K-9 Dutch multiple times prior to utilizing his TASER. Upon his observation that Coressel had released K-9 Dutch and was not continuing his violent actions, Officer Jenkins recalled K-9 Dutch who returned back to Officer Jenkins.

Officer Huynh provided clear directions to Coressel to place his arms out to his sides at which time Coressel complied and was taken into custody without incident. Additionally, Officer Jenkins immediately contacted the CP to request an RA shortly after Coressel was taken into custody, due to the K-9 contact and TASER deployment.

The UOFRB noted, and I concur, that Metropolitan Division K-9 officers utilized the time they had to assess the incident, formulated a tactical search plan, established lines of communication, utilized all available resources, and make proper notifications. Once Metropolitan Division K-9 officers arrived at scene, they utilized their available time to open lines of communication with the initial patrol officers and the IC in order to acquire a clear understanding of the incident and determined if met the K-9 deployment criteria for a search. Upon K-9 Dutch locating Coressel, Coressel became physically violent and aggressive with K-9 Dutch. Metropolitan Division K-9 officers observed Coressel attempting to physically injure K-9 Dutch and ordered Coressel to cease his actions. Coressel refused to comply and continued his attack on K-9 Dutch as officers closed the distance and deployed a TASER to de-escalate tactical situation and prevent further aggressive behavior which may have potentially led to further injury to Coressel. Metropolitan Division K-9 officers were presented with a rapid and dynamic tactical situation in which they were required to make decisions that balanced their own safety and welfare as well as Coressel's.

### **Additional Tactical Debrief Topics**

**Passing Unsearched Vehicles** – The investigation revealed Officers Castillo and Suchecki, upon their arrival at scene, observed the stolen white Ford F150 pickup truck described in the radio call located in front of 230 Bernard Avenue. They illuminated the vehicle and observed Coressel to be the only occupant. Coressel, shortly thereafter, fled on foot as Officers Castillo and Suchecki followed in their police vehicle. Officers Castillo and Suchecki passed the stolen vehicle while pursuing Coressel in their vehicle. In response to the sudden and rapid nature in which Coressel exited the vehicle and fled on foot, officers only visually cleared the suspect vehicle in order to maintain visual contact of Coressel. Officers Castillo and Suchecki are reminded of the importance of systematically and thoroughly clearing a vehicle, as well as the possible dangers of additional suspects concealing themselves within vehicles. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Basic Firearm Safety Rules** – The investigation revealed that Officer Suchecki briefly allowed the muzzle of his service pistol to cover Officer Castillo's back during the incident. Even though this incident was dynamic and fluid in nature, and Officers Suchecki and Castillo had just exited their vehicle and were in foot pursuit of Coressel, Officer Suchecki is reminded to remain mindful of the Department's Basic Firearm Safety Rules at all times. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands** – The investigation revealed that Officers Jenkins and Huynh provided simultaneous non-conflicting commands to Coressel to let go of K-9 Dutch as they approached Coressel. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. In



order to enhance future performance, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Use of Force Warning** – The investigation revealed that a Use of Force Warning was not provided by Officer Huynh prior to Officer Huynh discharging his TASER at Coressel. In this case, as Officer Huynh closed distance with Coressel, he observed that Coressel had his arm around K-9 Dutch's neck area while utilizing his bodyweight on top of K-9 Dutch, who had obtained a bite hold. Officer Huynh's rapid approach, while providing Coressel commands to let go of K-9 Dutch, required Officer Huynh to make a rapid assessment of the situation, which limited the time he had to provide a verbal warning. Officer Huynh is reminded of the importance of providing a Use of Force Warning, when feasible, prior to utilizing less-lethal control devices. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

*Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.*

*Command and Control is a process where designated officers use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct officers and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).*

*Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).*

*Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).*

The investigation revealed Sergeant Jacobs was the first supervisor to arrive at scene. Sergeant Jacobs declared himself the IC and established a CP at Machado Drive and Lincoln Boulevard. He contacted the Metropolitan Division K-9 Unit and requested their response. Sergeant Jacobs briefed Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins, on the circumstances of the incident. After being informed of the specifics of the search plan, Sergeant Jacobs approved the search plan and the deployment of the K-9. After the K-9 contact, Sergeant Jacobs was advised that the incident may potentially become a CUOF incident. Sergeant Jacobs notified FID of the potential for the incident to be investigated as a CUOF incident and had Officers Castillo and Suchecki separated and monitored at Pacific Station.

The investigation revealed Sergeant Miller was notified of a K-9 unit request in Pacific Division. Sergeant Miller contacted the Sergeant Jacobs and advised him that they would respond after the completion of a non-related K-9 search in North Hollywood Division. Sergeant Miller responded to the CP at Machado Drive and Lincoln Boulevard. Sergeant Miller was the K-9 Platoon supervisor at scene and was briefed by Sergeant Jacobs as well as provided details of the incident by Officers Castillo and Suchecki. Sergeant Miller confirmed that the incident met the criteria for the deployment of K-9 for a search. After the K-9 Contact, Sergeant Miller responded to the location where Coressel was taken into custody and began a Use of Force investigation. Additionally, he observed that the bite wound suffered by Coressel may be severe enough for the incident to become a CUOF incident and advised the IC. Sergeant Miller admonished Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale not to discuss the incident in the event the incident was determined to be a Categorical Use of Force. Additionally, Sergeant Miller had the officers separated and monitored at Pacific Station.

The UOFRB noted that although both Sergeants Jacobs and Miller were determined not to have formal findings, they met the requirements of supervisors during a CUOF incident. The UOFRB noted numerous positive steps taken by the supervisors at scene including active oversight and monitoring, in maintaining control of the overall tactical situation. The sergeants adhered to their roles as supervisors and completed their assigned tasks while maintaining effective command and control over the incident. The UOFRB additionally noted that significant amount of time that elapsed before it was confirmed that Coressel would be admitted to the hospital for his injuries. Sergeant Miller's experience was noted as he initiated CUOF protocols before Coressel was admitted.

The actions of Sergeants Jacobs and Miller were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

### **Tactical Debrief**

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale's tactics did not deviate from approved Department tactical training.



Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved officers to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Although it was determined that Officers Castillo and Suchecki would not receive formal findings, I believe that they would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief to discuss this multi-faceted incident in its entirety to enhance future performance.

Therefore, I will direct that Officers Jenkins Huynh, Ramirez, Governale, Castillo, and Suchecki attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

**Note:** Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

### **General Training Update (GTU)**

On November 15, 2019, Officers Jenkins and Huynh attended a General Training Update (GTU). All mandatory topics were covered including K-9 Contacts.

### **Use of Force – General<sup>17</sup>**

*It is the policy of this Department that officers may use only that force which is “objectively reasonable” to:*

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

*The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the*

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<sup>17</sup> Special Order No. 4, 2020 – Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

*appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:*

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
  - *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
  - *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
  - *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
  - *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
  - *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
  - *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
  - *The availability of other resources;*
  - *The training and experience of the officer;*
  - *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
  - *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
  - *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.*
- (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10)*

### **Less-Lethal Use of Force<sup>18</sup>**

*Whenever practicable, officers shall exercise de-escalation techniques to resolve potential use of force incidents and seek voluntary compliance from suspects/subjects.*

*The courts have held that Less-Lethal force options are “capable of inflicting significant pain and may cause serious injury.” Therefore, consistent with the Department’s Use of Force Policy, Less-Lethal force options are only permissible when:*

- *An officer reasonably believes the suspect or subject is violently resisting arrest or poses an immediate threat of violence or physical harm.*

*Less-Lethal force options shall not be used for a suspect or subject who is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence or mere non-compliance by a suspect do not alone justify the use of Less-Lethal force.*

**TASER:** *An officer may use the TASER as a reasonable force option to control a suspect when the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.*

*Because the Department recognizes that each tactical situation is unique and that officers must be given the flexibility to resolve tactical situations in the field, there is no pre-set limit*

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<sup>18</sup> Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.



*on the number of times the TASER can be used in a particular situation; however, officers should generally avoid repeated or simultaneous activations to avoid potential injury to the suspect. The Department looks to the “objectively reasonable” standard and the totality of the circumstances in determining the reasonableness of the force used, which may include the number of times a particular force option was utilized. Thus, officers must continually evaluate the situation they are in and the apparent effectiveness of the force option they have selected. If the force option they have selected does not appear to be effective, officers should consider transitioning to another, and potentially more effective, objectively reasonable force option.*

*The optimal range for the X-26 TASER is 7-15 feet. This range gives the most effective spread of the probes to accomplish neuro-muscular incapacitation (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 4.5, Electronic Control Device TASER –July 2018).*

**Officer Huynh – TASER**, three TASER activations, all in probe mode.

First TASER Activation – One six-second activation in probe mode, from an approximate distance of ten feet.

According to Officer Huynh, he did not observe the initial contact between Coressel and K-9 Dutch; however, as Officer Huynh turned the corner of the northeast corner of the residence, he observed an active engagement between the Coressel and K-9 Dutch. As Officer Huynh approached Coressel and K-9 Dutch, he observed that there was nothing immediate in Coressel’s hands. Coressel was choking and actively fighting K-9 Dutch, while K-9 Dutch had a bite hold on Coressel. As Officer Huynh approached to a distance of approximately eight to ten feet, he determined that transitioning to a less-lethal tool was the optimal option based on Coressel’s violent behavior with the dog. Officer Huynh opined that if officers attempted to physically take Coressel into custody, Coressel’s violent behavior toward K-9 Dutch would translate toward the officers. There would also be a high potential an officer could be bitten if they approached K-9 Dutch, while engaged in a struggle with Coressel. Officer Huynh observed Coressel was in a curled-up position with a choke hold on K-9 Dutch, while at the same time putting his body weight on top of K-9 Dutch. Based on the positioning of Coressel and K-9 Dutch, Officer Huynh was sure K-9 Dutch couldn’t get out of Coressel’s hold, leading K-9 Dutch to continue to defend himself against Coressel. Officer Huynh stated he was concerned for Coressel’s welfare because the longer Coressel held onto the dog, and the dog had the bite hold, the greater potential for Coressel to be injured even further. Officer Huynh deployed his TASER in order to de-escalate Coressel’s aggressive resistance and incapacitate Coressel long enough so that Coressel would release his choke hold of K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh aimed his TASER at Coressel’s back area and activated it in probe mode. Officer Huynh stated there was no time to feasibly issue a Use of Force Warning because Coressel was already aggressively choking and holding down K-9 Dutch.

Officer Huynh recalled,

*"I could see that there was nothing immediate in his hands other than the fact that he was choking the dog. I elected at that point even though I could hear in the background someone calling out TASER up I knew that I was in the only position to the apply -- to apply any less lethal force. So, I elected at that point to holster my sidearm and transition to my TASER as I began to move forward. The closer I got I could see that the suspect had the dog and there was a bite hold that the dog had on the suspect. The suspect was actively fighting the dog. And as I approached to a distance of maybe eight - eight to 10 feet my options were beginning to narrow because I realized at this point that the one, for sure I -- I wasn't in a position to deploy any type of lethal force. Now I've made the decision to go to the less lethal and the reason for that is his behavior with the dog, his violent behavior with the dog I knew it would eventually translate to me if I would just go put hands on.<sup>19</sup>*

*I did -- I was concerned about his welfare because the longer he held onto the dog and the dog had the bite hold of him the -- the greater potential for him being injured even further. But being a handler myself I also know that the dog can't be recalled if he's choking the dog and the dog is only doing mother nature defending himself at that point.<sup>20</sup>*

*So the only options that I had in front of me to deescalate this and stop his aggressive resistance to our tool, our arrest tool, was to use the TASER and incapacitate him long enough so that he would release the dog and I'd be able to get closer and one of us would be able to get hands on. Because he had the dog and if he didn't release the dog if we were to just -- and all of this is going through my mind. If I went up or one of us went up and tried putting hands on him the fight between him and the dog would definitely translate over to one of us. Meaning for sure from him in my mind it was a hundred percent it was going to translate to us but because the dog is in a fight and the potential for myself or one of the other handlers getting bit was very high as well.<sup>21</sup>*

*So I knew at this point I had to -- I had to use the TASER to stop his aggressive behavior but and -- and to explain why there was no time to feasibly give him the warning was by the time I got to about that seven to eight feet or eight to feet he had now because he was originally in that curled-up position with the choke hold he had now spun to where he was putting his body weight on top of the dog. That for sure I knew the dog couldn't get out. And the reason I say that is if the dog can't get out he's going to continue to defend himself and the injury to the suspect would just increase. And if he -- and because he spun on himself or spun over the dog now one of his hands were out of my view. So, the TASER was my only option at that point to -- to prevent any further escalation of force and to deescalate what was going on as fast as possible.<sup>22</sup>*

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<sup>19</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 16, lines 3-21.

<sup>20</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 16-17, lines 23-25 and 1-4.

<sup>21</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 17, lines 5-19.

<sup>22</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 17-18, lines 20-25 and 1-11.



*That I may use a TASER when suspect is violently resisting arrest which at that point, he was violently resisting a tool of our arrest and that violence was going to translate to me.*<sup>23</sup>

*Well, that the suspect was -- is violently resisting arrest and that the immediate threat of violence and physical harm would occur if I -- if I didn't use the TASER.*<sup>24</sup>

*Typically, we try to get the dog. If -- if -- if the tactical position presents itself where recalling the dog immediately. You know he's unarmed, you know he's not going pop up with a knife and charge one of us then yes, we would typically try to get the dog off as fast as possible. In this particular case, the dog couldn't be recalled because he had hold of the dog. So, in regards to the training of the dog the dog is allowed to defend himself if he's engaged and he -- and he cannot be recalled. And in this particular case he clearly would not be able to recall to our side because the suspect had a hold of him.*<sup>25</sup>

*Actually, when he rolled over, he gave me the perfect -- the ideal aiming target area which was his back. And I saw the opportunity there and I discharged the TASER and I saw the probes land in a diagonal from left to lower right pattern on his lower back.*<sup>26</sup>

*I only heard what occurred until I turned the corner and saw the act -- active engagement between the suspect and dog.*<sup>27</sup>

Second TASER Activation – One five-second activation in probe mode, from an approximate distance of ten feet.

According to Officer Huynh, after his initial TASER activation, he observed the TASER darts make solid contact with Coressel's back and observed that the TASER didn't have the immediate effect of neuromuscular incapacitation that a TASER commonly generates. Officer Huynh observed Coressel continue to have mobility in his arms and was still thrashing around. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a second time in order to prevent Coressel from re-engaging K-9 Dutch and going back to his violent behavior. Officer Huynh recalled,

*"And during that when the initial darts or probes landed and it didn't have that immediate effect that everyone thinks the TASER has. And I -- what I witnessed was that the suspect was still had his mobility of his arms and he's still moving around thrashing around. I knew at that point that I needed to continue the sec -- with a follow-up, a*

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<sup>23</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 18, lines 18-21.

<sup>24</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 19, lines 6-9.

<sup>25</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 19-20, lines 17-25 and 1-3.

<sup>26</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 21, lines 7-11.

<sup>27</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 22, lines 7-9.

*second activation in order to prevent his -- his going back to that violent behavior because there's no way I could put hands on him if he's still flailing around.*<sup>28</sup>

*I don't want to put any percentage, but it doesn't have the lock up and freezing of that.*<sup>29</sup>

Third TASER Activation – One five-second activation in probe mode, from an approximate distance of ten feet.

According to Officer Huynh, after the second activation ended there was a brief moment where Coressel was able to sit himself back up and grab K-9 Dutch again. Officer Huynh observed that Coressel was able to get full mobility again and Coressel's arm was wrapped around K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh believed that allowing Coressel to re-engage and continue to fight with K-9 Dutch would only increase the potential for injury to Coressel. Officer Huynh believed he needed to give Officer Jenkins the opportunity to call K-9 Dutch back so that no further injury would be sustained by Coressel, who was actively fighting K-9 Dutch. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a third time in order to limit Coressel's aggressive behavior and allow K-9 Dutch to be recalled.

Officer Huynh recalled,

*"After the second activation ended there was a brief moment where he was able to sit himself back up and then he grabs the dog again. At that point, I knew I have -- I have to give the handler the opportunity to call the dog back if he doesn't let this dog go the -- the potential to -- for injury for him escalates even further. And again, going back to officer safety, if he's going to do that to the dog, he's definitely going to translate to me. I'm going in there. If I put my hands on and now the dog's in a fighting mode again both of us are going to get injured. That's why I activated the third time."*<sup>30</sup>

*That -- it didn't do much more but it prevented him -- it -- it pulled his hands in to his side to -- closer to his body where the dog was released.*<sup>31</sup>

*When that second TASER ride ended. That's when he was able to get full mobility again and he went for the dog.*<sup>32</sup>

*His arm had wrapped around the dog but because I saw it at that point I knew that even with the minimal effect that I had from the TASER it would at least take -- take his hands off the dog so that the dog could be removed from the picture.*<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 24, lines 8-17.

<sup>29</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 25, lines 15-16.

<sup>30</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 24-25, lines 18-25, 1-3, and 5.

<sup>31</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 25, lines 21-23.

<sup>32</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 26, lines 3 and 5-6.

<sup>33</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 26, lines 11-15.



*It actually locks him up more than the first two and whether it almost seemed like he surrendered but that's just my -- not surrender but like almost, okay, I'm not going to do this again but again, that's my speculation. And but based on what I've seen he pulled back enough to where I let that third ride go and then I -- I didn't see a need to activate it again. He actually laid back on his back.<sup>34</sup>*

In this case, the UOFRB considered Officer Huynh's experience of approximately eight and a half years as a K-9 handler during their assessment of the use of the TASER by Officer Huynh during the K-9 contact incident. As Officer Huynh moved forward towards Coressel and K-9 Dutch, Officer Huynh observed K-9 Dutch with a bite hold of Coressel while Coressel had a "choke hold" on K-9 Dutch as Coressel utilized his bodyweight to pin K-9 Dutch down to the ground.

The UOFRB considered Officer Huynh's verbal attempts to command Coressel to release K-9 Dutch, to which Coressel did not comply. Additionally, the tactical situation was dynamic and Officer Huynh made the rapid decision to utilize a TASER in an effort to de-escalate the encounter as he believed K-9 Dutch would not be able to free himself from the struggle as Coressel was utilizing his bodyweight to hold K-9 Dutch down. The UOFRB noted Officer Huynh, based on his experience, opined K-9 Dutch would naturally continue his bite hold to defend himself. Officer Huynh deployed his TASER in an effort to prevent Coressel from continuing to aggressively engage K-9 Dutch and potentially sustaining further injury.

Officer Huynh observed that his first TASER activation did not have the full neuromuscular incapacitation that a TASER commonly generates, which led to Coressel continuing his aggressive movement and having control of his limbs. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a second time in order to prevent further aggressive and violent actions by Coressel and allow K-9 Dutch to disengage and be recalled. The UOFRB noted Officer Huynh's observations that Coressel sat up after the second TASER activation had completed and continued his violent actions when he attempted to grab K-9 Dutch around his neck area. Officer Huynh activated his TASER a third time to cease Coressel's aggressive actions towards K-9 Dutch which would prolong the physical confrontation with K-9 Dutch, may draw Officer Huynh or his team members into the confrontation, and potentially increase the level of injury to Coressel or officers. Upon Officer Huynh's third TASER activation, Coressel ceased his physical resistance and laid on his back. Officer Huynh advised he assessed through each of his TASER activations and observed Coressel's compliance after the third TASER activation.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Huynh, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe the applications of the TASER to stop Coressel's actions was objectively reasonable.

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<sup>34</sup> Officer Huynh, Page 26-27, lines 19-25 and 3.

Therefore, I find Officer Huynh's Less-Lethal Use of Force utilizing the TASER to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

### **DEPLOYMENT OF K-9**<sup>35</sup>

*Department K-9s have proven to be invaluable in Department operations. Department K-9s may be used to assist officers in the performance of their duties when such assistance is beneficial to Department operations and to community welfare. When a police service dog is deployed, the dog handler shall have sole responsibility for the control and direction of the dog.*

*Consistent with Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 571, Department K-9s may be used in the following circumstances:*

- *In the detection, control and apprehension of a suspect when there is a reasonable suspicion of the suspect's involvement in criminal activity;*
- *In the search of buildings and large areas for suspects;*
- *In the investigation of a crime or possible crime;*
- *In searches for narcotics and/or narcotic paraphernalia;*
- *In searches for explosives and/or explosive devices; or,*
- *In criminal and non-criminal incidents to assist in the search for missing juveniles or adults.*

*At the start of a K-9 search, the K-9 officer directing the search shall give or cause to be given a K-9 announcement and warning that a K-9 will be deployed. In those situations, where noise or perimeter size is a factor, consideration should be given to the use of a vehicle or helicopter public address system (K-9 Manual, Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011).*

Sergeant Miller and Officer Jenkins responded to the CP of the K-9 request in Pacific Division. And met with Sergeant Jacobs who informed them of the circumstances of the incident. Additionally, Officers Castillo and Suchecki provided Sergeant Miller with further detailed information on the initial radio call and Coressel's description. Based on the information he received, Sergeant Miller confirmed that the criteria for a K-9 deployment for a search was met and authorized K-9 officers to conduct a search for the GTA suspect. Officer Jenkins formulated a tactical search plan utilizing two K-9 search teams. Sergeant Miller concurred with the search plan and informed Sergeant Jacobs on the specifics of the tactical search plan. Sergeant Jacobs approved both the search plan and the deployment of K-9 for a search.

According to Officer Jenkins, he formulated a tactical search plan that consisted of two K-9 search teams working in coordination with each other. Officer Jenkins was designated to lead the first K-9 search team with K-9 Dutch and Officer Peters was designated to lead the second search team with K-9 Storm. The search plan involved Officer Jenkins' team responding and searching the location where Coressel jumped over the fence, 721 Ozone Street, then holding at

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<sup>35</sup> K-9 Manual, Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011



that position. Officer Peters' team would search the alley north of Ozone Street, south of Navy Street. If Coressel was not located, Officer Jenkins' intended for the K-9 teams to move north to Navy Street and starting from mid-block, search the south side of Navy Street.

Between 0009 and 0021 hours, multiple K-9 search announcements were made over the PA systems from police vehicles positioned around the perimeter. Additionally, Unit Air 3 gave a K-9 Announcement above the search area. The officers making the announcements utilized the pre-recorded message from the MDC in their respective police vehicles. Their positions on the perimeter and shop numbers were documented by Sergeant Miller.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the post contact procedures were consistent with established criteria.

### **CONTACT OF K-9<sup>36</sup>**

*The use of a K-9 is a valuable tool in the detection of suspects, and generally not an apprehension tool. When a K-9 contact occurs the K-9 team will be evaluated on the ability to detect and the K-9 officers' ability and skill level in the management and control of his/her search team deployment.*

*LAPD Metropolitan Division K-9 Search announcement:*

*"To the person or persons who are hiding from the police. Make your location known to us immediately. Put down all weapons, come out with your hands raised, and follow directions. If you do not, a police dog will be used to find you. When the dog finds you, do not move or you may be bitten. You have one minute to surrender" (Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011).*

In this case, multiple K-9 announcements were made via the PA systems; however, Coressel failed to respond to the K-9 announcements. Coressel remained hidden from sight and continued to evade detection and apprehension by officers.

According to Officer Jenkins, K-9 Dutch continually worked along the front of some residences along the south side of Navy Street, until K-9 Dutch made a right turn into a narrow walkway between the residences of 738 and 740 Navy Street. Officer Jenkins and his team moved to a position where they could see down the side of the residences. Officer Jenkins observed K-9 Dutch had moved south to the end of the walkway and as he was coming back he started to sniff some plants. As K-9 Dutch was searching, Officer Jenkins heard someone yell. Based on Officer Jenkins hearing the yell and observing the action from K-9 Dutch's hind quarter area, it appeared that a contact had occurred. Officer Jenkins did not actually see the contact occurring until Coressel came out into the middle of the walkway between the two residences.

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<sup>36</sup> K-9 Manual, Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011.

According to Officer Jenkins, he was not able to see what initiated the contact but believed that based on his experience and on K-9 Dutch's training, if someone yells and moves to make that yelling sound; it is something that could have been interpreted by K-9 Dutch as violent threat. Officer Jenkins opined yelling is an action that is typically accompanied by movement. Officer Jenkins believed that Coressel's actions of yelling and movement possibly prompted K-9 Dutch to respond with a bite. He observed Coressel become very aggressive with K-9 Dutch as he placed K-9 Dutch in a carotid choke hold and rolled his body over onto K-9 Dutch's neck, pinning K-9 Dutch to the ground. Officer Jenkins immediately instructed Coressel to stop moving and to let go of K-9 Dutch. Coressel failed to comply to his repeated commands to stop moving. Coressel continued his very aggressive attack on K-9 Dutch and appeared that he was trying to physically harm K-9 Dutch.

The UOFRB noted K-9 Dutch did not bark upon locating Coressel, as police service dogs are trained to do. Consideration was made to Officer Jenkins' 12 years of expertise and experience as a K-9 handler and trainer, when he opined that Coressel's loud yelling was possibly accompanied by movement which K-9 Dutch would have taken as a violent threat and reacted in accord with his training which was to make contact with Coressel. Additionally, the UOFRB noted the investigation could not determine if the K-9 contact occurred when Coressel yelled or when Coressel moved to the middle of the walkway, which is when Officer Jenkins first observed the K-9 contact.

**Note:** The UOFRB discussed that K-9 Dutch had been involved in a K-9 search in North Hollywood Division for a GTA suspect, just prior to this incident. K-9 Dutch successfully located that suspect and barked to notify Officer Jenkins. K-9 Dutch obeyed Officer Jenkins commands and that suspect was arrested without incident.

According to Officer Jenkins, he directed his team to move up in order to get into a closer position to better assess the tactical situation. Based on Coressel's aggressive behavior towards K-9 Dutch, Officer Jenkins formed the opinion that Coressel would additionally fight with officers if they attempted to physically contact and take Coressel into custody. Officer Jenkins assessed he needed to get K-9 Dutch away from Coressel's hold. According to Officer Jenkins, K-9 Dutch was still biting Coressel and the only way to minimize and prevent additional injury to Coressel would be to stop his aggressive violent behavior toward K-9 Dutch. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, recall K-9 Dutch and safely take Coressel into custody, Officer Jenkins requested a TASER to be deployed.

According to Officer Jenkins, he observed Officer Huynh's first TASER activation did not fully stop Coressel's actions and Coressel continued to fight with K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins heard a second TASER activation and observed a moment where it seemed like Coressel let go of K-9 Dutch. Officer Jenkins immediately recalled K-9 Dutch by issuing multiple "Platz" commands, which are heel commands. Officer Jenkins also utilized his E-collar in conjunction with his first three "Platz" commands. Additionally, K-9 Dutch released his bite hold during Officer Jenkins second "Platz" command. Officer Jenkins then observed Coressel reach out and grab K-9 Dutch, which caused K-9 Dutch to re-engage with Coressel.



After the third TASER activation, Coressel released K-9 Dutch and laid on his back. Officer Jenkins issued additional “Platz” commands to help navigate K-9 Dutch back to Officer Jenkins’ position, at which point he placed K-9 Dutch on a leash.

The UOFRB considered Officer Jenkins multiple attempts to order Coressel to stop moving and let go of K-9 Dutch. Coressel refused to comply to the commands. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, recall K-9 Dutch, and safely take Coressel into custody, Officer Jenkins requested a TASER to be deployed. Officer Jenkins believed that Coressel’s violent actions would lead to further injury to Coressel, due to K-9 Dutch having a bite hold on Coressel, and K-9 Dutch’s training to continue to keep a hold of Coressel until being recalled. Officer Jenkins observed that Coressel’s bodyweight on K-9 Dutch would prevent K-9 Dutch from being recalled.

The UOFRB noted, once the TASER was deployed by Officer Huynh, Officer Jenkins continued to monitor the encounter and observed that the TASER had some effect, however, it was not the full neuromuscular incapacitation that the TASER is intended for. Officer Jenkins observed that Coressel still was moving around in a violent and aggressive manner and was continuing to resist. The UOFRB noted Officer Jenkins redeployed further north, away from the physical confrontation, while continuing to monitor Coressel’s physical compliance. Once Officer Jenkins observed a moment where Coressel released K-9 Dutch, and K-9 Dutch could safely be recalled, he issued his verbal “Platz” command in conjunction with activating K-9 Dutch’ E-Collar. The UOFRB considered that Coressel attempted to re-engage and grab K-9 Dutch again which appeared to cause confusion and possible hesitation after K-9 Dutch had released his bite hold and began to return to Officer Jenkins. Although K-9 Dutch had released his bite hold during Officer Jenkins’ second “Platz” command, Officer Jenkins continued to verbally issue “Platz” commands in order to guide K-9 Dutch back to him around the officers on his team. Officer Jenkins issued a total of nine “Platz” commands before K-9 Dutch reached him. Additionally, the UOFRB noted the confined area where the K-9 contact occurred, as well as the disruptive and loud ambient noise created by the air unit circling overhead and Coressel’s continued yelling.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the K-9 Contact was consistent with established criteria.

#### **POST K-9 CONTACT PROCEDURES**<sup>37</sup>

*When a K-9 contact occurs and the subject of the contact is hospitalized (admitted) as a result of the contact, the incident is classified as a Categorical Use of Force incident and Force Investigation Division (FID) shall respond and conduct the investigation. When any supervisor investigating a K-9 contact becomes aware that the injury is likely to result in hospitalization, the K-9 supervisor shall make the appropriate notifications. The K-9 platoon OIC shall ensure that a K-9 supervisor is assigned to assist FID with its investigation as it relates to the K-9 related investigation (K-9 Manual, Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011).*

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<sup>37</sup> K-9 Manual, Los Angeles Police Department, Metropolitan Division, 2011.

After Coressel was taken into custody, Officer Jenkins immediately contacted the CP to request a Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Coressel at 738 Navy Street. Officers Castillo and Suchecki, responded to Coressel's location and positively identified Coressel as the GTA suspect that fled from the stolen vehicle.

Santa Monica Fire Department (SMFD) personnel responded to the scene and transported Coressel to University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Santa Monica Hospital for a dog bite injury to his right lower leg and TASER puncture wounds to his back.

Sergeant Miller determined Coressel's leg injury caused by the K-9 contact may be severe enough to require hospitalization and advised Sergeant Jacobs. Sergeant Miller, believing the incident could result into a CUOF, admonished Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale not to speak about the incident and had them separated and monitored at Pacific Division Community Police Station. Sergeant Miller advised Sergeant Jacobs that the incident may potentially become a CUOF. Sergeant Jacobs had Officers Castillo and Suchecki separated and monitored at Pacific Division Community Police Station and later notified FID of the potential for the incident to be investigated as a CUOF.

According to the FID investigation, at 0416 hours, Detective T. Grabe, Serial No. 32649, FID, received telephonic notification to respond to Pacific Division Community Police Station to conduct a CUOF Assessment of the K-9 contact.

According to the FID investigation, Coressel was treated at UCLA Santa Monica Hospital and later released and cleared to be booked. At approximately 0441 hours, Officers Baeza and Jalomo transported Coressel to Pacific station for booking. While waiting to be booked, Coressel's leg bandage came off, requiring the response of Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD). Coressel was subsequently transported by an LAFD RA to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center.

According to the FID investigation, at 1050 hours, after learning that Coressel would be admitted to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center, Detective A. Rheault, Serial No. 33961, FID, notified the DOC, of Coressel's hospitalization and that FID would be handling the administrative investigation related to the K-9 Contact.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the post contact procedures were consistent with established criteria.

### **Additional/Equipment**

**Police Attire** – The investigation revealed that Officer Governale was wearing a tactical utility uniform and a tactical vest; however, his tactical vest was non-descript and did not have the required distinctive law enforcement identification markings on the front. Captain L. Sands, Serial No. 25012, Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Division, advised that this issue was addressed through the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) and the issuance of a



Notice to Correct Deficiencies for this incident. Additionally, Captain Sands advised that a visual inspection was conducted on all Metropolitan Division K-9 officers' tactical vests to ensure they were adorned with the proper identifying markings in accordance with Department Standards. The Commanding Officer of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau (CTSOB) and the Director of the Office of Special Operations (OSO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

**TASER Positioning** – The investigation revealed that Officer Governale's TASER was secured to his tactical vest on his primary-hand side, in neither a cross draw or support side draw position. Captain Sands advised that this issue was addressed through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of Notice to Correct Deficiencies for this incident. Additionally, Captain Sands advised that a visual inspection was conducted on all Metropolitan Division K-9 officers' tactical vests to ensure that their TASER were in accordance with Department Standards. The Commanding Officer of CTSOB and the Director of OSO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

**Ballistic Helmets** – The investigation revealed that Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, Governale, and Peters, did not don their ballistic helmets during the K-9 search. Although, the Metropolitan Division K-9 officers were not required to don their ballistic helmets based on the specific criteria for K-9 searches for unarmed suspects at the time, officers are reminded of the importance of donning their ballistic helmets while involved in a tactical situation involving searches for outstanding felony suspects.

Captain Sands advised this issue was addressed through divisional training and a revised divisional order requiring all Metropolitan Division K-9 officers to don their ballistic helmets and vests on all searches for outstanding felony suspects. The Commanding Officer of CTSOB and the Director of OSO concurred with these actions. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

**BWV Activation** - The investigation revealed Officer Castillo had a late activation during the incident. An analysis by Pacific Division determined Officer Castillo had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain B. Morrison, Serial No. 30789, Commanding Officer, Pacific Patrol Division, addressed this issue through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of Operations – West Bureau (OWB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The investigation revealed Officers Suchecki had a late activation during the incident. An analysis by Pacific Division determined Officer Suchecki had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain Morrison addressed this issue through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OWB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Operations – West Bureau conducted a random inspection of BWVs assigned to Officers Castillo and Sucheki from May 1, 2020 through May 30, 2020, for compliance with BWV policy specific to late activation. The results of the inspection indicated both officers were in compliance.

The investigation revealed Officers Baeza did not activate his BWV while transporting Coressel from Santa Monica Hospital to Pacific Station. An analysis by Pacific Division determined Officer Baeza had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain Morrison addressed this issue through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OWB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The investigation revealed Jalomo did not activate his BWV while transporting Coressel from Santa Monica Hospital to Pacific Station. An analysis by Pacific Division determined Officer Jalomo had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain Morrison addressed this issue through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OWB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Operations – West Bureau conducted a random inspection of BWVs assigned to Officers Baeza and Jalomo from May 1, 2020 through May 30, 2020, for compliance with BWV policy specific to no activation. The results of the inspection indicated both officers were in compliance.

The investigation revealed that Officer I. Guillermo, Serial No. 35060, Metropolitan Division, had a late activation of his BWV while conducting a pedestrian stop on a possible suspect on the perimeter. An analysis by Metropolitan Division determined Officer Guillermo had no prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain Sands addressed the issue with divisional training and an informal discussion. The Commanding Officer of CTSOB and the Director of OSO concurred with these actions.

Special Operations Group conducted a random inspection of BWV assigned to Officer Guillermo from April 30, 2020 through June 30, 2020, for compliance with BWV policy specific to late activation. The results of the inspection indicated Officer Guillermo was compliant on seven of eight selected incidents, which have been addressed with the issuance of a SAI and an Employee Comment Sheet.

The investigation revealed Officer B. Collins, Serial No. 33382, Metropolitan Division had a late activation while conducting a pedestrian stop on a possible suspect on the perimeter. An analysis by Metropolitan Division determined Officer Collins had one prior BWV non-compliance incidents. Captain Sands addressed the issue through the generation of a SAI and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of CTSOB and the Director of OSO concurred with these actions. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Special Operations Group conducted a random inspection of BWVs assigned to Officer Collins from September 12, 2019 through November 12, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to late activations. The result of the inspection indicated Officer Collins was in compliance.



### **Audio/Video Recordings**

**Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)** – Force Investigation Division investigators reviewed the DICVS to ascertain if any DICVS-equipped units responded to this incident. The investigation determined there were a total of 12 Pacific units equipped with DICVS. Eight had footage of their response and subsequent positions on the perimeter. Officers Baeza and Jalomo, had footage of the transport of Coressel from Santa Monica Hospital to Pacific station. There was no DICVS footage of the K-9 contact.


**Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Force Investigation Division investigators reviewed footage obtained from the BWV system. The investigation determined that 24 officers from Pacific Area responded to the scene and activated their BWV at some point during their response. Nine officers from Metropolitan Division responded to the perimeter, two of those officers, Officers Guillermo and Collins, activated their BWVs during an encounter with a member of the public. A review of the BWV footage determined Officer Suchecki BWV footage captured the foot pursuit with Coressel. Six Metropolitan Division K-9 officers responded to the perimeter and conducted a K-9 search. Officers Jenkins, Huynh, Ramirez, and Governale activated their BWVs and captured Coressel's movements and audio during the K-9 contact.

### **Chief's Direction**

I will direct the Director of the Office of Special Operations to complete the current review of the updated K-9 Procedures and Guidelines Handbook, which is undergoing review and input by subject matter experts. The Department will continue to evaluate best practices, ensuring consistent and effective protocols for the deployment of the Department's police service dogs. It should be noted that the proposed revisions to the current K-9 Procedures and Guidelines Handbook, if applied, would not have impacted the outcomes of this incident.

Additionally, as noted in this incident was a lack of departmentwide standardized policy guiding officers on when to don ballistic helmets when conducting an organized tactical search for a felony suspect. I am directing that one uniform policy be drafted requiring the use of ballistic helmets during organized searches unless there is a clearly delineated exigency given specific circumstances.

Respectfully,






  
MICHEL R. MOORE  
Chief of Police

Date: 8-3-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT  
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC NO. 047-19	CF NO.	DR. NO. 19-1421578
K-9 Contact		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

<b>Location of Incident</b> 738 Navy Street, Santa Monica	<b>RD</b> 9999	<b>Date of Incident</b> October 7, 2019	<b>Date and Time of Board Review</b> July 6, 2020, 1230 hours
<b>Chair</b> Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	<b>Signature of Approving Board Members:</b>		
<b>Member (Office of Special Operations)</b> Assistant Chief H. Frank, Serial No. 25958			
<b>Member (Personnel and Training Bureau)</b> Captain R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
<b>Member (Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau)</b> Commander H. Leslie, Serial No. 25419			
<b>Member (Officer Peer)</b> Officer A. Green, Serial No. 36890			
<b>Training Division Representative</b> Sergeant M. Patriquin, Serial No. 26502			
<b>Presenting Commanding Officer</b> Captain L. Sands, Serial No. 25012			
<b>NOTES:</b>			
<b>ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:</b>			
<b>MODIFICATION TO PRESENT POLICY, PRACTICES OR TRAINING:</b>			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <p>RECEIVED AUG 14 2020</p> <p>2020 AUG -4 PM 1:30 POLICE COMMISSION</p> <p>OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL</p> </div>			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <p>■ COP Date Signed: <u>8/3/20</u></p> <p>■ PC Date Submitted: <u>8/4/20</u></p> </div>			



Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Jenkins, Steven		Serial No. 26806	Rank/Class Police Officer III+I	Incident No. 047-19
Length of Employment 30 years, 4 months		Current Division Metropolitan	Time in Current Division 16 years, 11 months	
<b>K-9 Contact Board</b>				
<b>Use of Force Review Board</b>		<b>Chief of Police</b>		<b>Police Commission</b>
<b>Deployment of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Deployment of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Deployment of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria
<b>Contact of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Contact of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Contact of K-9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria
<b>Post K-9 Contact Procedures</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Post K-9 Contact Procedures</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria		<b>Post K-9 Contact Procedures</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Consistent with established criteria <input type="checkbox"/> Not consistent with established criteria
<b>Other Issues</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b>Other Issues</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b>Other Issues</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes: <i>Asst 2</i> <i>STO JA</i>				
<b>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

\*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

<b>Employee (Last Name, First, Middle)</b> Jenkins, Steven		<b>Serial No.</b> 26806	<b>Rank/Class</b> Police Officer III+I	<b>Incident No.</b> 047-19
<b>Length of Employment</b> 30 years, 4 months	<b>Current Division</b> Metropolitan		<b>Time in Current Division</b> 16 years, 11 months	
<b>Use of Force Review Board</b>		<b>Chief of Police</b>		<b>Police Commission</b>
<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes: <span style="font-family: cursive;">JD 2/16/02</span> <span style="font-family: cursive;">ST JAK</span>				
<b><u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

**\*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**



<b>Employee (Last Name, First, Middle)</b> Huynh, Nhut		<b>Serial No.</b> 31499	<b>Rank/Class</b> Police Officer III	<b>Incident No.</b> 047-19
<b>Length of Employment</b> 24 years, 7 months		<b>Current Division</b> Metropolitan	<b>Time in Current Division</b> 16 years, 3 months	
<b>Use of Force Review Board</b>		<b>Chief of Police</b>	<b>Police Commission</b>	
<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	
<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	
<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
Notes: <i>31499</i> <i>ST JA</i>				
<b><u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

\*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Ramirez, Alan		Serial No. 33872	Rank/Class Police Officer III	Incident No. 047-19
Length of Employment		Current Division Metropolitan	Time in Current Division	
<b>Use of Force Review Board</b>		<b>Chief of Police</b>	<b>Police Commission</b>	
<u><b>Tactics</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u><b>Tactics</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u><b>Tactics</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	
<u><b>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u><b>Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u><b>Less-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Less-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Less-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u><b>Non-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Non-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Non-Lethal Use of Force</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u><b>Unintentional Discharge</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Unintentional Discharge</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Unintentional Discharge</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u><b>Other Issues</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u><b>Other Issues</b></u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u><b>Other Issues</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
Notes: <i>ABR</i> <i>ST JA</i>				
<u><b>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</b></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

\*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.



<b>Employee (Last Name, First, Middle)</b> Governale, Alvaro		<b>Serial No.</b> 40360	<b>Rank/Class</b> Police Officer III	<b>Incident No.</b> 047-19
<b>Length of Employment</b>		<b>Current Division</b> Metropolitan		<b>Time in Current Division</b>

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<b><u>Tactics</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Unintentional Discharge</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<b><u>Other Issues</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: 34962 ST JA

<b><u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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**\*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**